The Impact of Market Timing on Canadian and U.S. Firms' Capital Structure by Zhaoxia Xu
Working Paper/Document de travail
2009-1
The Impact of Market Timing on Canadian
and U.S. Firms’ Capital Structure
by Zhaoxia Xu
www.bank-banque-canada.caBank of Canada Working Paper 2009-1
January 2009
The Impact of Market Timing on Canadian





Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
zxu@bankofcanada.ca
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in
economics and ﬁnance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ISSN 1701-9397 © 2009 Bank of Canadaii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Toni Gravelle, Scott Hendry, Michael King, Teodora Paligorova,
Jonathan Witmer, and seminar participants at the Bank of Canada for their helpful comments.iii
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of market timing on Canadian ﬁrms’ capital structure and makes a
comparison with U.S. ﬁrms. There is no evidence that market timing affects Canadian ﬁrms’
capital structure in the same manner as it affects their U.S. counterparts. The effect of past equity
issues on Canadian ﬁrms’ capital structure is transitory. Canadian ﬁrms adjust at a faster rate
toward the leverage target than U.S. ﬁrms. These results challenge the generality of the market-
timing theory of capital structure.
JEL classiﬁcation: G32
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
L’auteure examine si la théorie selon laquelle les entreprises optent pour le ﬁnancement par
actions lorsque les conditions sont favorables sur le marché aide à expliquer la structure du capital
des ﬁrmes canadiennes. À l’issue d’une comparaison entre le Canada et les États-Unis, elle
constate que rien ne démontre qu’un tel comportement inﬂue de la même manière dans les deux
pays : l’incidence des émissions passées d’actions sur la structure du capital des ﬁrmes
canadiennes est temporaire. Ces dernières retournent en effet plus rapidement à leur niveau cible
d’endettement que leurs consœurs américaines. Ces résultats remettent en question la validité
générale de la théorie examinée.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G32
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationalesI. Introduction
In ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions, equity market timing is the practice of issuing equity instead
of debt at high equity market values (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Many papers have provided
evidence that U.S. ¯rms time the equity market by issuing equity at high equity market
values, for example Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman
(2001). Baker and Wurgler (2002) relate market timing with capital structure and ¯nd that
these market timing ¯nancing decisions have long-lasting e®ects on capital structure. They,
therefore, suggest a market-timing theory that a ¯rm's observed capital structure is the
cumulative outcome of its past attempts to time the equity market.1
The ¯nding of the persistent e®ect of market timing on leverage is inconsistent with
the traditional static trade-o® theory. The static trade-o® theory argues that ¯rm value is
maximized at an optimal debt ratio, which is based on the trade-o® between tax bene¯ts and
the expected bankruptcy costs of debt. This theory suggests that a ¯rm's capital structure
is determined by its own characteristics and predicts no cumulative e®ects of past ¯nancing
decisions on the ¯rm's current leverage ratio.
Baker and Wurgler's paper initiated a new wave of debate in capital structure research.
A central question is how persistent is the impact of past ¯nancing decisions such as equity
market timing on capital structure. The static trade-o® theory predicts that when shocks
cause deviations from this optimum, ¯rms will quickly rebalance toward the target. There-
fore, past ¯nancing decisions should not have long-lasting e®ects on capital structure. The
1Another two versions of equity market timing are the dynamic adverse selection cost version of Myers
and Majluf (1984) with rational managers and investors and the dynamic mispricing version with irrational
investors (or managers). See Baker and Wurgler (2002) for detailed discussions on these two versions of
equity market timing. This analysis focuses on Baker and Wurgler (2002)'s market-timing theory.
1market-timing theory, in contrast, says that ¯rms do not have an optimal debt ratio, so they
do not quickly rebalance away the e®ects of past securities issues. Therefore, past ¯nancing
decisions a®ect capital structure persistently.
The empirical evidence is mixed. Huang and Ritter (2007) support Baker and Wurgler
(2002), showing that historical securities issues in°uenced by equity risk premia a®ect capital
structure persistently and ¯rms adjust very slowly toward target leverage. However, a few
papers challenge Baker and Wurger's ¯ndings of the persistent e®ects of market timing on
capital structure. Hovakimian (2006) shows that the driving force behind Baker and Wurgler
(2002)'s results is not past equity market timing, but the growth opportunities not captured
by the current market-to-book ratio. Kayhan and Titman (2007) also point out that the
signi¯cance of the Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure may be largely due to the fact that
historical market-to-book ratios may capture other determinants of capital structure choices,
such as growth opportunities.
The papers mentioned above only focus on U.S. ¯rms and yet no consensus has been
reached. A study that extends to other countries could potentially help test the robustness
and generality of the market-timing theory. Canada is a good candidate, since Canada and
U.S. have similar economic landscapes, legal systems, cultural and social traditions as well as
¯nancial market structure and regulations. Presumably, market timing should have similar
impacts on Canadian and U.S. ¯rms' capital structure. If this is the case, the results will
provide more evidence on the importance of market timing in the determination of ¯rms'
capital structure. If this is not the case, it will cast doubt on the generality of the market
timing theory.
In this paper, I test the market timing hypothesis using Canadian data and compare with
2the U.S. results. This paper ¯rst provides evidence that both Canadian and U.S. ¯rms appear
to time the market by issuing equity at high market values. There is a signi¯cantly positive
relation between the amount of equity issuance and a ¯rm's market value proxied by market-
to-book ratio and market-to-book ratio relative to the industry median. This is consistent
with the previous evidence that larger equity issues occur at high market valuations (For
example, Alti (2006) and Hovakimian et al. (2001)).
Next, a regression model similar to Baker and Wurgler (2002) is tested. Interestingly,
the market-timing measure, the weighted average of historical market-to-book ratios, does
not have a signi¯cant impact on Canadian ¯rms' capital structure as it does on U.S. ¯rms'
leverage. As a further examination, a direct test of whether initial public o®ering (IPO) equity
issues, a well-documented market timing event, a®ect a ¯rm's subsequent-year leverage ratio
is conducted. Consistent with the results on estimating Baker and Wurger's regression model,
the equity issues at the IPO signi¯cantly a®ect U.S. ¯rms', but not Canadian ¯rms', current
leverage ratios.
To further con¯rm the di®erence in the impacts of market timing on Canadian and U.S.
¯rms' capital structure, a cumulative adjustment model is estimated to obtain the cumulative
speed of adjustment. The cumulative speed of adjustment indicates how fast a ¯rm adjusts
toward its target leverage ratio since the market timing event. If a ¯rm quickly rebalances
away the e®ect of market timing, it will appear to adjust toward the target fast. A quick
adjustment also suggests there is a more important role for the optimal debt ratio in a ¯rm's
capital structure decisions and that past ¯nancing activities play no role in determining the
current leverage ratio. Compatible with the above results, Canadian ¯rms are found to adjust
toward the leverage target much faster than their U.S. counterparts.
3Finally, investigations on the potential reasons for the di®erence between Canadian and
U.S. ¯rms ¯nd that the di®erence in size and industry composition of ¯rms in the two
countries cannot explain the results. A matched U.S. sample by size and industry still
exhibit signi¯cant impact of market timing on capital structure. The investigation suggests
that a relative smaller infusion of equity capital and thus a smaller reduction in leverage
combined with more debt usage may explain the transitory e®ect of equity market timing on
Canadian ¯rms' leverage ratios. However, there may be other unexplored factors attribute
to the observed di®erence.
This study contributes to the literature in two respects. First, these results on Canadian
¯rms challenge the generality of the market-timing theory of capital structure. There is no
evidence of a long-term impact on Canadian ¯rms' capital structure as predicted by the the
market-timing theory. Second, this study increases the understanding of Canadian ¯rms'
capital structure, since few work on investigating market-timing in Canada. Canadian ¯rms'
capital structure appears to be better explained by the traditional determinants of leverage
variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III
tests the impact of market timing on capital structure. Section IV studies how equity issues
at the IPO a®ect capital structure. Section V estimates the cumulative speed of adjustment.
Section VI discusses the results and Section VII concludes.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
The ¯nancial statement data of Canadian ¯rms used in this study are from COMPUSTAT
Canadian and Report on Business (ROB) and those of American ¯rms are from COMPU-
4STAT.2 The sample period is between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2006. The initial
public o®ering (IPO) dates are determined using Securities Data Company (SDC) data. The
SDC data period is from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1999.3 Firms in the ¯nancial
industry with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 in COMPUSTAT or ROB industry classi-
¯cation code 13.6 are excluded from the sample. Firms are required to have ¯nancial data
available for the last ¯scal year before the IPO. Firms are included in the sample until the
¯rst year they exit COMPUSTAT. For comparability reasons, Canadian dollar amounts are
converted to U.S. dollars. Numbers reported in U.S. dollars are not adjusted. Firms with a
book value of total assets less than $5 million are excluded. The sample is winsorized at 1%
and 99%.
Figure 1 plots the detrended three-month moving average number of IPOs conducted
by Canadian and U.S. ¯rms. The number of IPOs for each month is determined using SDC
data.4 Following Alti (2006), a three-month moving average is taken for the monthly number
of IPOs to smooth out the seasonal variation. To remove the e®ect of economic growth, the
monthly moving average IPO volume is de-trended at a rate of 0.25% per month.5 As shown
in Figure 1, Canadian ¯rms o®er fewer IPOs than U.S. ¯rms. The median number of IPOs is
13 for Canadian ¯rms and 35 for U.S. ¯rms. An unreported ¯gure shows that Canadian ¯rms
also conduct fewer seasoned equity o®erings (SEO) than U.S. ¯rms. The median number of
SEOs is 24 for Canadian ¯rms and 50 for U.S. ¯rms.
The fewer number of IPOs by Canadian ¯rms compared to U.S. ¯rms may be related
2COMPUSTAT Canadian and ROB are merged to get more observations for Canadian ¯rms. ROB data
items are converted into COMPUSTAT ones using ¯nancial formula for the purpose of comparison with U.S.
¯rms.
3SDC data stop at 1999 to avoid involving truncation bias when studying data several years after IPO.
4Using Financial Post new issuance database for Canadian ¯rms yields similar results.
5Annual economic growth is assumed to be 3%
5to some features in the Canadian tax system that discourage companies from going public.
For example, the corporate tax rate is signi¯cantly lower for Canadian-controlled private
companies than that for public companies. Brown, Mintz, and Wilson (2000) document
that the combined federal and provincial corporate tax rate on the ¯rst $200,000 of business
income is 21% for private corporations and 43% for public ones. Figure 1 shows that relatively
more Canadian ¯rms went public in years 1987 and 1988. This may be because of the Junior
Capital Pool program that was initiated by the Alberta Stock Exchange in November 1986.
This program helped many small Canadian ¯rms, especially ¯rms in the oil and gas industry,
raise capital through an IPO in the late 1980s. Comparing the industry distributions of IPOs
in the two countries (based on 1 digit SIC codes), IPOs from the mining sector account for
43% of the total Canadian IPO volume, while IPOs from the manufacturing sector rank ¯rst
for the U.S. (Figure 2).
Table I compares the summary statistics for ¯rm characteristics and ¯nancing decisions
of Canadian and U.S. ¯rms. The IPO year is de¯ned as the ¯scal year when a ¯rm goes
public. The year prior to the IPO is called the pre-IPO year and IPO+k year is the k'th
¯scal year after the IPO. Each IPO+k subsample includes only ¯rms surviving k years after
the IPO. The Canadian sample is much smaller than the U.S. one: there are 164 Canadian
¯rms and 2800 U.S. ¯rms in the pre-IPO year. The number of observations decreases over
time due to bankruptcy, acquisition or merger, and other reasons which cause a ¯rm to exit
from COMPUSTAT or ROB databases.
Book leverage, D=IC, is de¯ned as the ratio of book debt to invested capital. Book debt
is debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long term debt (Item 9).6
6For observations only available in the ROB database, the corresponding data item are used. Appendix
lists the de¯nitions of all variables.
6Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item 216) plus minority interest (Item 38). Book debt
plus book equity is de¯ned as invested capital. Market leverage, D=M, is de¯ned as the ratio
of book debt to the market value of invested capital. The market value of invested capital is
book debt plus market equity. Market equity is common shares outstanding (Item 25) times
share price (Item 199). The short-term debt ratio, SD=IC, is debt in current liabilities
divided by invested capital. The long-term debt ratio, LD=IC, is the ratio of long term
debt to invested capital. Net debt issues d are de¯ned as the change in book debt divided
by invested capital. Net equity issues e are the change in book equity minus the change in
retained earnings divided by invested capital.
Table I shows that both Canadian and U.S. ¯rms are heavily leveraged in the pre-IPO
year. More than 50% of their invested capital is debt. When decomposing the debt into
long-term and short-term debt, we can see that on average Canadian ¯rms rely more on
short-term debt than U.S. ¯rms. 40% of Canadian ¯rms' debts are short term, while only
30% of debt used by U.S. ¯rms is short term. In the IPO year, both Canadian and U.S. ¯rms
issue a large amount of equity at relatively higher market-to-book ratios (M/B ratio is de¯ned
as the ratio of market equity to book equity), indicating that they time the equity market.
Funds raised in equity issues are used to retire debt and increase cash balances. However,
Canadian ¯rms issue a substantially smaller amount of equity than U.S. ¯rms. The smaller
infusion of equity results in a smaller drop in Canadian book leverage ratio (38% drop) than
in U.S. debt ratio (52% drop).
After going public, Canadian ¯rms subsequently have relatively higher leverage ratios.
There is no signi¯cant di®erence in long-term debt ratios between ¯rms in the two countries,
but Canadian ¯rms still have relatively more short-term debt than their U.S. counterparts.
7Heavier usage of short-term debt is consistent with the higher tangibility ratio (property,
plant and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets (Item 6), PPE/A) of Canadian ¯rms,
since short-term debts usually need tangible assets as collateral.
Comparing with U.S. ¯rms, Canadian public ¯rms in the sample on average are more
pro¯table, measured by EBITDA=A (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item
13) divided by total assets). However, they have much lower market-to-book ratios, indicating
lower market values and fewer growth opportunities. The lower valuation of Canadian-listed
¯rms compared to U.S.-listed ¯rms can be mainly explained by a country discount factor
(King and Segal (2003)). Canadian ¯rms spend much less on research and development
(R&D (Item 46)) and invest more on ¯xed assets (measured by capital expenditure (Item
128) INV=A), resulting in higher tangible ratios. The Canadian sample has larger tangible
assets, which may be simply because a large proportion of ¯rms in the sample are in the
mining sector.
Canadian ¯rms pay more dividends (common dividends (Item 21) divided by book equity,
DIV=E) and hold less cash (cash and short-term investments (Item 1) divided by total assets,
CASH=A). The higher dividend payments in Canada may be due to the dividend tax
credit that e®ectively reduces the individual tax rate on dividends received from Canadian
corporations. In Canada, individual shareholders are entitled to an equivalent of a 25%
dividend tax credit on Canadian dividend income; there is no special tax treatment on
dividends in the United States, (Brown et al. (2000)). Also, Canada has a much higher
e®ective tax rate on capital gains than the United States.7 The lower tax burden on capital
gains relative to dividends in the United States induces U.S. shareholders to prefer capital
7See Brown et al. (2000) for details.
8gains to dividends. Hence, U.S. companies generally pay less dividends than Canadian ¯rms.
In addition, intercorporate dividends are generally free of corporate tax in Canada; while in
the United States, companies generally need to pay tax on intercorporate dividends except
corporations that jointly ¯le a consolidated return.
III. Equity Market Timing and Capital Structure
A. Market Timing
The practice of equity market timing has been documented in many studies. The most
direct evidence is the survey paper by Graham and Harvey (2001), which ¯nds that two-thirds
of CFOs admit that perceived misvaluation is a primary concern of ¯nancing decisions. The
literature also shows that initial public o®erings (IPO) and the subsequent seasoned equity
o®erings (SEO) coincide with high market valuations.8 The long-run underperformances of
these equity issues are also interpreted as evidence of equity market timing.9
To examine whether Canadian and U.S. ¯rms in the sample raise more equity capital to
take advantage of the relatively lower costs of equity o®ered by high market valuations, a
direct test of the impact of M=B ratios on the amount of equity issues is conducted. Chen and
Zhao (2004) investigate the role of the market-to-book ratio in corporate ¯nancing decisions
and provide evidence that ¯rms with a higher market-to-book ratio are more likely to issue
equity because of lower external ¯nancing costs.
To examine how the amount of equity issuance varies with °uctuations in market value,
net equity issuance is regressed on the M=B ratio. A positive relation is expected if more
8See Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Gravelle (1996) for initial public o®erings and Taggart
(1977) Marsh (1982) Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Jung, Kim,
and Stulz (1996), and Hovakimian et al. (2001) for seasoned equity o®erings. Ritter (2003) documents the
evidence for market timing.
9See, for example, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995)
9equity is issued at higher market values. To address the concern about the variation in market
values across industries, a market-to-book ratio relative to the industry median market-to-
book ratio (RelM=B) is used to replace M=B. The RelM=B measures how high or low
a ¯rm's market-to-book ratio is relative to its industry peers. A larger value for RelM=B
indicates a high market value of the ¯rm and potentially an overvaluation.
Table II reports the estimation results using all ¯rm-year observations. As expected,
the coe±cient on the M=B ratio is signi¯cantly positive, implying that ¯rms issue more
equity as their M=B ratios go up. The result also holds after controlling for time series and
individual ¯rm e®ects. Similarly, equity issues increase with RelM=B. The positive relation
between equity issuance amount and market values is consistent with the practice of equity
market-timing.10
B. The Impact of Market Timing on Leverage
Above we documented that market timing does occur. Now we examine whether market
timing has a signi¯cant e®ect on Canadian and U.S. ¯rms' capital structure. If a ¯rm's capital
structure is explained by the static trade-o® theory, the ¯rm will adjust toward its target
leverage ratio whenever there is a deviation from the optimal level. In this case, market
timing should not have a long-lasting impact on the ¯rm's capital structure. However, if
there is a long-lasting impact, it implies a minimal role for the traditional static trade-o®
theory.
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), I use the external ¯nance weighted average market-
to-book ratio (MBefwa) as a market-timing measure to test the market timing theory of the
10These results only re°ect the sensitivity of the amount of yearly equity issues on market values for public
¯rms, but not for private ¯rms because of the unavailability of ¯rm valuation data.














where the summations are taken starting in the IPO year and ending in the year t-1 to avoid




er + dr) is the ratio of current period external ¯nance to the total external
¯nance over the study period. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), the minimum weights
are set to zero. Firm-year observations with MBefwa bigger than 10 are dropped. The
MBefwa;t takes a bigger value if a ¯rm raises external funds at high market-to-book ratios,
since it gives larger weights to higher market valuations. This may not be a perfect measure
of market timing, and as such an alternative measure is used in the later section.
To investigate the relation between leverage and market timing, a regression model similar
to Baker and Wurgler (2002) is estimated. Speci¯cally, the current year leverage ratio is
regressed on the market-timing measure MBefwa and four other main determinants of capital
structure, namely market-to-book ratio (M/B), pro¯tability (EBITDA/A), size (log(S)), and
tangibility (PPE/A).
















where Lt represents leverage ratios. M=B, EBITDA=A, log(S), and PPE=A are ¯rm char-
acteristic variables identi¯ed by previous research as the main determinants of a ¯rm's capital
structure (Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovic
(2001)). An insigni¯cant coe±cient on MBefwa will provide more support for the static
trade-o® theory.
11C. Results
Table III reports the results of the regression model for both book and market leverage.
The impact of ¯rm characteristics on leverage is consistent with previous research on the
determinants of leverage and the e®ects are similar for Canadian and U.S. ¯rms. The market-
to-book has a negative e®ect on capital structure, which is consistent with Myers (1977)
underinvestment theory and the di±culty of borrowing against intangible assets such as
future growth opportunities. The negative coe±cient on EBITDA=A is consistent with
the hypothesis that more pro¯table ¯rms have a larger amount of internal funds and thus
demand less debt. log(S), a proxy for size, is positively related to leverage because larger
¯rms have more debt capacity. The tangibility of assets measured by PPE=A has a positive
coe±cient, which is consistent with the view that ¯rms with more tangible assets have more
debt because tangible assets can serve as collateral.
However, the impact of the market-timing measure on capital structure is di®erent across
¯rms in the two countries. Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002) and others, MBefwa
is found to have a signi¯cantly negative impact on U.S. ¯rms' capital structure. The e®ect
is signi¯cant even 7 years after IPO. Interestingly, the same result does not hold for Cana-
dian ¯rms. The market-timing measure does not signi¯cantly a®ect Canadian ¯rms' capital
structure. The signs of the MBefwa coe±cient are mixed and mostly insigni¯cant. The
result for Canadian ¯rms is more consistent with the prediction of the trade-o® theory that
¯rms should quickly rebalance away the e®ect of past equity issues, so that market timing
does not have long-lasting e®ects on capital structure. A regression model including only
the traditional variables that imply an optimal leverage like M/B, pro¯tability, size, and
tangibility also yields higher R2s when using Canadian data than when using U.S. data. It
12suggests that the traditional determinants of capital structure can better explain Canadian
¯rms' leverage ratios.
D. Alternative Market Timing Measure
The weighting scheme of MBefwa implicitly assumes that equity issuance is the main
way of external ¯nancing when there is a timing opportunity in the equity markets. This
assumption may not always be plausible, especially in countries where stock markets are
relatively less developed than U.S. markets. To circumvent this, I also use a ratio of current
equity ¯nancing to total equity ¯nancing over the study period as weights. Using this equity
¯nancing ratio as the weights emphasizes the response of the ¯rm' equity issues to market-














Table IV repeats regression (2) using this alternative market-timing measure. It shows
that market timing still signi¯cantly a®ects the capital structure of U.S. ¯rms, but not
Canadian ¯rms. The results are also robust to regressions controlling for time series e®ects
using year dummies. Another concern is the relatively smaller sample of Canadian ¯rms.
Regressions that estimate the standard errors using a bootstrap technique do not change
these results either.11
IV. Impact of IPO Equity Issues on Leverage
The market timing theory predicts that ¯rms do not rebalance away the impact of market
timing on their leverage. A more direct test of the hypothesis would be to identify a market
11The tables are not presented to save space, but are available upon request.
13timing event and examine its subsequent e®ects. Initial public o®ering (IPO) may be the
most well-known market timing behaviour. Many studies have shown that IPO issuers do
time the market.12 We know that equity issues at the IPO reduce a ¯rm's leverage. The
question is whether the ¯rm will quickly rebalance away the e®ect in subsequent years. Past
equity issuance should not a®ect the ¯rm's current leverage under the static trade-o® theory.
However, the market-timing theory predicts that they have a persistent e®ect. Thus, a direct
test of the impact of equity issues on current leverage will help distinguish between these
competing theories. The regression model includes the IPO equity issues as a regressor,
controlling for ¯rm characteristics, time series e®ects, and ¯rm e®ects as follows:
Li;t = ®0 +
T X
j=1















+ yrt + ui + ²i;t: (4)
where ei;IPO is the net equity issuance in the IPO year by ¯rm i; yrt is year dummy;
PT
j=1 ei;IPO £ yrt is the sum of the interactive terms between net equity issues in the IPO
year and the dummies for j years after IPO.
The coe±cient ®1;j captures the direct impact of IPO equity issues on the ¯rm's current
capital structure j years after the issuance. If ¯rms quickly rebalance away the e®ect of
equity infusion, the coe±cient should be insigni¯cant in the subsequent years after IPO. The
advantage of this test is that it isolates the e®ect of IPO from other market timing attempts.
A persistent and signi¯cant coe±cient would indicate that ¯rms do not quickly rebalance
away the e®ect of past equity issues. In comparison, the market-timing measure, MBefwa,
contains both IPO and SEO equity issues, and therefore, it is not clear whether the persistent
e®ect is a consequence of non-rebalancing or repeated market timing.
12See, for example, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004)
14Table V presents the results of the regression model for both Canadian and U.S. ¯rms.
The model is estimated controlling for the correlations within panels.13 Consistent with
the results in the previous section, IPO equity issues have di®erent impacts on the capital
structure of ¯rms in the two countries. For U.S. ¯rms, the equity issues in the IPO year
have a signi¯cantly negative impact on current leverage. Equity infusion at IPO signi¯cantly
reduces leverage ratio and the e®ect is relatively persistent. As time passes, the impact of
the IPO equity issues on U.S. ¯rms' current capital structure decreases.
In contrast, the e®ect of equity issues at the IPO is weak and transitory for Canadian
¯rms. For the book leverage regression, the coe±cients on IPO equity issues are generally
insigni¯cant. For the market leverage regression, the coe±cients on eIPO are signi¯cantly
negative only up to 3 years after IPO. Furthermore, the signi¯cant level is much lower
than that for the U.S. ¯rms. The results of Canadian ¯rms are more consistent with the
prediction of the trade-o® theory. Past equity issues do not appear to have a long-lasting
e®ect on Canadian ¯rms' capital structure. Canadian ¯rms rebalance away the impact of
market timing equity issues much more quickly than their U.S. counterparts.
V. Cumulative Speed of Adjustment
The above analyses show that the impact of market timing on Canadian ¯rms' capital
structure is more transitory than in the United States. This implies that Canadian ¯rms
immediately rebalance away the e®ects of past ¯nancing activities and therefore adjust toward
the leverage target more quickly than U.S. ¯rms. That is, Canadian ¯rms should have a faster
speed of adjustment. To test this conjecture, a cumulative adjustment model is estimated
13Bootstrap estimations yield similar results.
15to obtain the cumulative speed of adjustment. A cumulative adjustment model, instead of
a partial adjustment model, is tested to take account of` the fact that ¯rms may not make
adjustments every year and the speed of adjustment may be di®erent each year which is not
permitted by a partial adjustment model. A cumulative adjustment model can estimate the
extent to which leverage changes from the event year are explained by deviations of the event
year leverage ratio from the target.
Li;t ¡ Li;IPO = ®(L
¤
i;t ¡ Li;IPO): (5)
where Li;t is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at year t; Li;IPO is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at
IPO year; and L¤
i;t is ¯rm i's target leverage at year t; ® measures the cumulative speed of
adjustment since the IPO year. It indicates how fast a ¯rm has closed the gap between the
leverage target and its debt ratio at IPO year. 0 < ® < 1 would indicate a partial adjustment;
® = 0 would imply no adjustment, and ® = 1 would indicate a complete adjustment. The
reduced-form, cumulative adjustment model is then:
Li;t = (1 ¡ ®)Li;IPO + ®L
¤
i;t (6)
Unfortunately, the target leverage ratio is unobservable. The most commonly used proxy
is the prediction from the beginning-of-period ¯rm characteristics of the form:
L
¤
i;t = ° + ¯Xi;t¡1 + (´t + vi;t): (7)
where Xi;t¡1 is a vector of ¯rm characteristics that determine a ¯rm's leverage ratio including
M=B, EBITDA=A, log(S), and PPE=A, ´t is the time series e®ect, and vi;t is the distur-
bance term. With the above speci¯cation, the target debt ratio may vary both across ¯rms
and over time (Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Huang and Ritter
16(2007)). The ¯tted values from this regression model are used as a proxy for the leverage
target.
Table VI presents the OLS estimates of the cumulative speed of adjustment for Canadian
and U.S. ¯rms. Canadian ¯rms on average adjust at a speed of 58% two years after IPO.14
Seven years after IPO, Canadian ¯rms almost close the gap between the leverage ratio and
their leverage target. However, U.S. ¯rms adjust much more slowly than Canadian ¯rms.
Two years after IPO, U.S. ¯rms adjust 32% toward the target and the annual speed of
adjustment decreases in subsequent years. They only reduce half of the deviation from the
target by seven years after IPO. Canadian ¯rms' fast speed of adjustment is consistent with
the above results that equity market timing only has a very short-term e®ect on their capital
structure.
VI. Potential Reasons on the Observed Di®erences
It's somehow surprising to ¯nd that market timing does not a®ect the capital structure of
Canadian ¯rms as it does with U.S. ¯rms, given that Canadian and U.S. economic landscapes
are similar in may ways, including in°ation, market interest rates, and economic growth. This
section attempts to examine the possible reasons explaining the di®erent impacts of market
timing on Canadian and U.S. ¯rms' capital structure.
14Theoretically, the sum of the coe±cients on Li;IPO and L¤
i;t should be one. However, the sum of the
estimated coe±cients is one because the unobserved target leverage ratio, L¤
i;t, is proxied by ¯tted valued
from Equation eq:target which may be subject to estimation errors. One may need to be cautious in making
in°uences on the estimated speed of adjustment.
17A. Industry Distributions
Figure 2 has shown that the majority of Canadian IPOs are from the mining sector, while
the biggest fraction of U.S. IPOs are from the manufacturing industry. So, the di®erences
in industry distributions could be a potential reason for the discrepancy in the impacts of
market timing on Canadian and U.S. ¯rms' capital structure.
To explore this possibility, Figure 3 compares the industry distributions of sample ¯rms.15
Although the majority of IPOs by Canadian ¯rms are from mining sector while those by U.S.
¯rms are from manufacturing, the di®erence does not hold for ¯rms in the ¯nal regression
samples. In both samples, the manufacturing sector accounts for the largest proportion.
The substantial drop in the number of mining ¯rms from the Canadian IPO sample may be
because many mining sector IPOs are small ¯rms using the Junior Capital Pool Program.
These ¯rms will be delisted by the Alberta Stock Exchange if they fail to complete their
major transaction (usually an asset acquisition) in 18 months. However, ¯rms in the ¯nal
regression samples are relatively larger ¯rms. As a robustness check, controlling for industry
e®ects in the estimation of the above models yields similar results. Therefore, industry
distributions cannot explain the di®erent e®ects of market timing on capital structure in the
two countries.
B. Matched U.S. Sample Results
As documented in Table I, Canadian ¯rms are generally smaller than U.S. ¯rms. It is
possible that the di®erence in the impacts of market timing on leverage is due to di®erence in
size of ¯rms in the two countries. To examine this possibility, I identify a group of U.S. ¯rms
1510% of Canadian ¯rms are not in this ¯gure, because ROB database do not have the SIC codes.
18that are of similar size and in the same industries based on one-digit SIC codes as Canadian
¯rms and reestimate the regressions using this subsample.
Table VII con¯rms that the ¯ndings for U.S. ¯rms are generally preserved in this matched
sample. Speci¯cation (1) demonstrates that the market timing measure, MBefwa still has a
signi¯cantly negative impact on the market leverage ratio, although the e®ect is less signi¯-
cant using the book leverage ratio. Equity issues at IPO signi¯cantly a®ect the ¯rms' current
leverage several years after IPO as shown in Speci¯cation (2). The speeds of adjustment for
these matched U.S. ¯rms are still slower than the Canadian ¯rms. These U.S. ¯rms only
close 52% of the gap in the IPO-year leverage ratio and the target debt ratio 7 years after
IPO, which is in contrast to the 91% adjustment by Canadian ¯rms. In sum, the di®erence
in the impacts of market timing on capital structure in Canada and the U.S.A. cannot be
fully explained by the di®erence in size or industry composition of ¯rms in the two countries.
C. Equity Issues
Table I showed that Canadian ¯rms raise much less equity capital than U.S. ¯rms, so the
infusion of equity reduces Canadian ¯rms' leverage ratios to a smaller extent than it does for
U.S. ¯rms. The average leverage ratio of Canadian ¯rms drops from 50% to 31% while that
of U.S. ¯rms drops from 51% to 25% in the IPO year. To further compare the di®erence in
equity issues, Figure 4 plots the annual median proceeds from IPO raised by Canadian and
U.S. ¯rms scaled by each ¯rm's total assets to take account the fact that bigger ¯rms can
issue larger amounts of equity than smaller ¯rms.16
The Canadian ¯rms' median proceeds from IPO are smaller than their U.S. counter-
16Firms with total assets less than $0.01 million are excluded to avoid the in°uence of extreme ratios from
small denominators.
19parts'.17 In addition, Canadian ¯rms conducted fewer SEOs and raised less funds from
SEOs. The median number of SEOs per month for Canadian ¯rms is 24 and that for U.S.
¯rms is 50 and the median amount of funds raised through SEOs by Canadian ¯rms scaled
by ¯rm size is 12% and that by U.S. ¯rms is 17%. The relatively infrequent and smaller
amount of fund raised by Canadian ¯rms through SEOs implies that the rebalancing e®orts
toward the leverage target are less o®set.
Witmer and Zorn (2007) ¯nd that Canadian ¯rms face higher costs of equity than U.S.
¯rms, which may explain the smaller amount of equity issued by Canadian ¯rms. The smaller
infusion of equity capital results in smaller impacts on Canadian ¯rms' capital structure.
Therefore, it may be easier for Canadian ¯rms to o®set the smaller e®ects. In addition,
Canadian ¯rms use more debt than U.S. ¯rms in the subsequent years after IPO as shown
in Table I. The debt issues indicate Canadian ¯rms' e®ort to rebalance away the e®ect of
equity issues. The smaller magnitude of reduction in leverage ratios caused by equity issues
combined with more debt usage in the subsequent years may explain the more transitory
e®ects of market timing equity issues on Canadian ¯rms' capital structure.
Although the smaller infusion of equity issues and more reliance on debt may help to
explain quicker rebalanceing behavior of Canadian ¯rms, there may be potentially other
factors account for the di®erence in capital structure adjustments of ¯rms in the two countries.
For example, Frank and Goyal (2007) show that CEOs matter a lot for the variation in
leverage among U.S. ¯rms using hand-collected data about backgrounds and characteristics
of the executives. The potential di®erences among CEOs of ¯rms in the two countries
17The exceptions are Year 1989 and Year 1990 which are mainly a result of very few observations in
matched Canadian IPO and ¯nancial variable sample. The unscaled annual average proceeds per issue in
Canada is smaller than those in the U.S.A.
20might play a role in explaining the di®erential behaviour of capital structure. However, this
possibility is not investigated in this study due to the availability of data.
VII. Conclusions
This paper compares the impacts of market timing on Canadian and U.S. ¯rms' capital
structure. Market timing, measured by the historical market-to-book ratio, does not a®ect
Canadian ¯rms' capital structure as it a®ects U.S. counterparts. Compared to the United
States, the e®ects of past equity issues at the IPO on Canadian ¯rms' current leverage ratio
are more short lived. Canadian ¯rms rebalance away the e®ect of market timing more quickly
and adjust much faster toward the leverage target than U.S. ¯rms. These ¯ndings challenge
the generality of Baker and Wurgler (2002)'s market timing theory. Canadian ¯rms' capital








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table II: Equity Issue and Market Value
This table reports the sensitivity of equity issues on market values. The dependent variable is net equity
issues in each year, de¯ned as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings divided by
invested capital. In Panel A, the independent variable market value is measured by market-to-book ratio
M=B, market equity divided by book equity. In Panel B, market value is measured by market-to-book
ratio relative to industry median market-to-book ratio. The industry median market-to-book ratio is the
median of M=Bs of ¯rms in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code each year. The estimates of
constant are not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics are in bracket. ¤¤¤ denotes 1% signi¯cant level,
¤¤ denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and ¤ denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Canada US
Panel A
M=Bt 3.25*** 3.05*** 1.25*** 1.16*** 1.11*** 1.43***
(16.37) (15.51) (5.71) (2.72) (3.04) (3.46)
Y ear Dummies N Y Y N Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y N N Y
N 3499 3499 3499 24754 24754 24754
R2 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02
Panel B
RelM=Bt 5.04*** 5.09*** 1.95*** 2.26** 1.62* 2.73**
(6.29) (11.56) (4.00) (2.02) (1.70) (2.50)
Y ear Dummies N Y Y N Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y N N Y
N 3493 3493 3493 24754 24754 24754










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table V: The Impact of IPO Equity Issues on Leverage
This table reports results of regressions of book and market leverage on equity issues in IPO year and























Book leverage is book debt divided by invested capital. Book debt is de¯ned as current liabilities (COM-
PUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long term debt (Item 9). Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item 216)
plus minority interest (Item 38). Book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as invested capital. Market
leverage is the ratio of book debt to market value of assets (Item 25 £ Item 199 plus book debt). Market
leverage is the ratio of book debt to market value of assets (Item 25 times Item 199 plus book debt). eIPO
is net equity issues in the IPO year. ei;IPO£yrt is interactive terms between net equity issues at the IPO
and the dummies for each year after IPO. Market-to-book ratio is de¯ned as market equity divided by
book equity. EBITDA=A is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided by total
assets. log(S) is logarithm of net sales (Item 12). PPE=A denotes net property, plant and equipment
(Item 8) divided by total assets. Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤ denotes 1%
signi¯cant level, ¤¤ denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and ¤ denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Book Leverage Market Leverage
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
eIPO £ yr1 -0.10 -0.17*** -0.13 -0.13***
(1.09) (5.48) (1.48) (8.30)
eIPO £ yr2 -0.13* -0.18*** -0.12* -0.16***
(1.66) (6.30) (1.69) (9.75)
eIPO £ yr3 -0.18** -0.17*** -0.17** -0.16***
(2.26) (4.69) (2.23) (8.56)
eIPO £ yr4 -0.14* -0.12*** -0.12 -0.17***
(1.69) (3.20) (1.50) (8.35)
eIPO £ yr5 -0.09 -0.12*** -0.04 -0.16***
(1.01) (3.06) (0.48) (8.03)
eIPO £ yr6 -0.14 -0.07** -0.05 -0.13***
(1.49) (2.02) (0.58) (6.38)
eIPO £ yr7 -0.19* -0.03 -0.10 -0.10***
(1.82) (0.78) (1.03) (5.18)
M=Bt¡1 -2.39*** -0.59*** -4.48*** -1.14***
(5.43) (3.42) (10.83) (13.35)
EBITDA=At¡1 -0.53*** -0.41*** -0.43*** -0.27***
(8.19) (11.00) (7.02) (12.20)
log(S)t¡1 4.38*** 4.24*** 3.99*** 3.08***
(7.46) (8.87) (7.29) (8.64)
PPE=At¡1 0.26*** 0.37*** 0.18*** 0.27***
(6.41) (11.15) (4.75) (11.74)
N 735 10710 728 10823
R2 0.22 0.15 0.28 0.23
28Table VI: Cumulative Speed of Adjustment
This table estimates the cumulative speed of adjustment from the cumulative adjustment model.
Li;t ¡ Li;IPO = ®(L¤
i;t ¡ Li;IPO)
Li;t = (1 ¡ ®)Li;IPO + ®L¤
i;t
where Li;t is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at year t; Li;IPO is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at IPO year; ®
measures the cumulative speed of adjustment since the IPO year; and L¤
i;t is ¯rm i's target leverage at
year t estimated from:
L¤
i;t = ° + ¯Xi;t¡1 + ´t + vi;t
where Xi;t¡1 is a vector of ¯rm characteristics that determine a ¯rm's leverage ratio including M=B,
EBITDA=A, log(S), and PPE=A, ´t is time series e®ects, and vi;t is the disturbance term. Book leverage
is book debt divided by invested capital. Book debt is de¯ned as current liabilities (COMPUSTAT
Annual Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9). Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item 216) plus
minority interest (Item 38). Book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as invested capital. Market-to-book
ratio is de¯ned as market equity divided by book equity. EBITDA=A is earnings before interest, taxes,
and depreciation (Item 13) divided by total assets. log(S) is logarithm of net sales (Item 12). PPE=A
denotes net property, plant and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets. The estimates of constant are
not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics are in bracket. ¤ ¤ ¤ denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ¤¤ denotes
5% signi¯cant level, and ¤ denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Canada U.S.
IPO+2 IPO+4 IPO+7 IPO+2 IPO+4 IPO+7
LIPO 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.09 0.68*** 0.53*** 0.51***
(6.37) (3.10) (0.89) (35.23) (19.53) (14.24)
L¤
t 0.59*** 0.78*** 0.97*** 0.49*** 0.61*** 0.66***
(8.67) (9.39) (7.86) (22.90) (21.71) (16.57)
N 133 109 84 2055 1582 1043
R2 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.72 0.62 0.57
29Table VII: Matched U.S. Sample Results
This table presents the results of the impact of the market timing measure, equity issues at IPO, and
estimated cumulative speed of adjustment using the matched U.S. ¯rms with similar size and industry
as the Canadian ¯rms. The constant estimates are not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics are in
bracket. ¤ ¤ ¤ denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ¤¤ denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and ¤ denotes 10% signi¯cant
level.
Speci¯cation (1) Speci¯cation (2) Speci¯cation (3)
Book L Market L Book L Market L IPO+2 IPO+4 IPO+7
MBefwa;t¡1 -0.81 -3.84***
(1.07) (6.14)
M=Bt¡1 -2.93*** -1.82*** -1.16*** -1.74***
(4.79) (3.64) (3.49) (6.76)
EBITDA=At¡1 -0.43*** -0.22*** -0.49*** -0.31***
(4.55) (2.85) (5.96) (4.75)
log(S)t¡1 5.01*** 4.78*** 4.39*** 3.64***
(4.36) (5.09) (4.45) (4.71)
PPE=At¡1 0.71*** 0.41*** 0.66*** 0.33***
(9.67) (6.83) (10.59) (6.57)
eIPO £ yr1 -0.10 -0.18***
(1.17) (2.78)
eIPO £ yr2 -0.14* -0.27***
(1.72) (4.18)
eIPO £ yr3 -0.10 -0.29***
(1.11) (4.29)
eIPO £ yr4 -0.27*** -0.30***
(2.62) (3.71)
eIPO £ yr5 -0.28*** -0.27***
(2.66) (3.26)
eIPO £ yr6 -0.21* -0.22**
(1.73) (2.28)
eIPO £ yr7 -0.01 -0.15
(0.09) (1.51)
LIPO 0.68*** 0.52*** 0.48***
(9.07) (6.21) (3.66)
L¤
t 0.51*** 0.62*** 0.72***
(6.59) (7.35) (5.54)
N 453 457 639 645 124 93 60
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Figure 4: Annual median proceeds from IPO scaled by ¯rm size 1986-1999.
34Appendix: De¯nitions of Variables
D(book debt) De¯nition 3: Debt in current liabilities (Compustat Annual Item 34)
+long term debt (Item 9)
E(book equity) De¯nition 2: Shareholders' equity (Item 216)+minority interest (Item 38)
Market equity Common shares outstanding (Item 25)£share price (Item 199)
IC Invested capital=book debt+book equity
A Total assets (Item 6)
M Market value of assets=market equity+book debt
D/IC Book leverage=book debt/(book debt+book equity)
D/M Market leverage=book debt/market value of assets
M/B Market-to-book ratio=market value of equity/book value of equity
EBITDA/A Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13)/total assets
log(S) logarithm of net sales (Item 12)
PPE/A Net property, plant and equipment (Item 8)/total assets
R&D Research and development expenditure (Item 46, replaced by zero if missing)
INV/PPE Capital expenditures (Item 128)/PPE
DIV/E Common dividends (Item 21)/book equity
CASH/A Cash and short-term investments (Item 1)/total assets
¢RE/A Change in retained earnings (Item 36)/total assets
d Net debt issues=change in book debt/invested capital
e Net equity issues=(change in book equity-change in retained earnings)
divided by invested capital
35REFERENCES
Alti, Aydogan, 2006, How persistent is the impact of market timing on capital structure?, Journal
of Finance 61.
Asquith, Paul, and David W. Mullins, 1986, Equity issues and o®ering dilution, Journal of Financial
Economics 15, 61{89.
Baker, Malcolm, and Je®rey Wurgler, 2002, Market timing and capital structure, Journal of Finance
57, 1{32.
Booth, Laurence, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2001, Capital
structures in developing countries, Journal of Finance 56, 87{130.
Brown, Robert D., Jack M. Mintz, and Thomas A. Wilson, 2000, Coporations and taxation a largely
private aatter?, in Radall K. Morck, (ed.) Concentrated corporate ownership (The University
of Chicago Press).
Chen, Long, and Xinlei Zhao, 2004, Understanding the roles of the market-to-book ratio and
pro¯tability in corporate ¯nancing decisions, Working paper, Michigan State University.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2002, Testing trade-o® and pecking order predictions
about dividends and debt, The Review of Financial Studies 15, 1{33.
Flannery, Mark J., and Kasturi P. Rangan, 2006, Partial adjutment and target capital structures,
Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming.
Frank, Murray, and Vidhan Goyal, 2007, Corporate leverage: How much do managers really matter,
Working paper, University of Minnesota.
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate ¯nance:
Evidence from the ¯eld, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187{243.
Gravelle, Toni, 1996, The importance of beliefs in monetary & ¯nancial settings, Ph.D. thesis,
University of Western Ontario.
Hovakimian, Armen, 2006, Are observed capital structures determined by equity market timing?,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 71.
Hovakimian, Armen, Tim Opler, and Sheridan Titman, 2001, The debt-equity choice, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 1{24.
Huang, Rongbin, and Jay Ritter, 2007, Test the market timing theory of capital structure, Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis forthcoming.
Jung, Kooyul, Yong Cheol Kim, and Rene M. Stulz, 1996, Timing, investment opportunities, man-
agerial discretion, and the security issue decision, Journal of Financial Economics 42, 159{185.
Kayhan, Ayla, and Sheridan Titman, 2007, Firm's histories and their capital structure, Journal of
Financial Economics 83, 1{32.
King, Michael R., and Dan Segal, 2003, Valuation of canadian -vs. u.s.-listed equity: Is there a
discount, Working paper, Bank of Canada.
36Korajczyk, Robert, Deborah Lucas, and Robert McDonald, 1991, The e®ects of information releases
on the pricing and timing of equity issues, Review of Financial Studies 4, 685{708.
Loughran, Tim, and Jay Ritter, 1995, The new issues puzzle, Journal of Finance 50, 23{51.
Loughran, Tim, Jay Ritter, and Kristian Rydqvist, 1994, Initial public o®erings: International
insights, Paci¯c-Basin Finance Journal 2, 165{199.
Marsh, Paul, 1982, The choice between equity and debt: An empirical study, Journal of Finance
37, 121{144.
Myers, Stewart C., 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5,
147{175.
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, Corporate ¯nancing and investment decisions
when ¯rms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13,
187{221.
Pagano, Marco, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Why do companies go public? an empirical
analysis, Journal of Finance 53, 27{64.
Purnanandam, Amiyatosh K., and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2004, Are IPOs really underpriced?,
Review of Financial Studies 17, 811{848.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 1995, What do we know about capital structure? some
evidence from international data, Journal of Finance 50, 1421{1460.
Ritter, Jay, 1991, The long-run performance of initial public o®erings, Journal of Finance 42,
365{394.
Ritter, Jay, 2003, Investment banking and securities issues, in George Constantinides, Milton Harris,
and Rene Stulz, (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Elsevier North-Holland).
Taggart, Robert A., 1977, A model of corporate ¯nancing decisions, Journal of Finance 32, 1467{
1484.
Witmer, Jonathan, and Lorie Zorn, 2007, Estimating and comparing the implied cost of equity for
canadian and u.s. ¯rms, Working paper, Bank of Canada.
37